Harms and Wrongs in Epistemic Practice
Edited by: Simon Barker, Charlie Crerar, and Trystan S. Goetze
How we engage in epistemic practice, including our methods of knowledge acquisition and transmission, the personal traits that help or hinder these activities, and the social institutions that facilitate or impede them, is of central importance to our lives as individuals and as participants in social and political activities. Traditionally, Anglophone epistemology has tended to neglect the various ways in which these practices go wrong, and the epistemic, moral, and political harms and wrongs that follow. In the past decade, however, there has been a turn towards the non-ideal in epistemology. This volume gathers new works by emerging and world-leading scholars on a significant cross section of themes in non-ideal epistemology. Articles focus on topics including intellectual vices, epistemic injustices, interpersonal epistemic practices, and applied epistemology. In addition to exploring the various ways in which epistemic practices go wrong at the level of both individual agents and social structures, the papers gathered herein discuss how these problems are related, and how they may be addressed.
Table of Contents
• Harms and Wrongs in Epistemic Practice
Simon Barker, Charlie Crerar, and Trystan S. Goetze
• Can Closed-Mindedness be an Intellectual Virtue?
• Caring for Esteem and Intellectual Reputation: Some Epistemic Benefits and Harms
• Understanding Epistemic Trust Injustices and Their Harms
• On Anger, Silence, and Epistemic Injustice
• Just Say ‘No!’: Obligations to Voice Disagreement
Casey Rebecca Johnson
• On Empathy and Testimonial Trust
• Ambivalence About Forgiveness
• The Epistemology of Terrorism and Radicalisation
• Healthcare Practice, Epistemic Injustice, and Naturalism
Ian James Kidd and Havi Carel
• What is Epistemically Wrong with Conspiracy Theorising?
The conference proceedings will be published in November 2018 as Volume 84 of the Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements. This book series is considered a supplement to the Royal Institute of Philosophy's professional journal, Philosophy, and published by Cambridge University Press. Contributions originated as papers presented at the conference and have been subjected to double-blind peer review. For more information about the book series, including how to order copies, click here.